Abstract:
Introduction
Awareness that intellectual property raises distinctive economic issues long predates the modern law and economics movement. The economics of property rights in intellectual goods are now well understood and have been extensively discussed in the ground-breaking law and economics literature (Kitch, 1977 , Merges and Nelson, 1992 , Posner and Landes, 2003 Posner 2011) . Standard accounts of the patent system have also emphasized several features of the law that promote economic efficiency: legal protection for invention encourages investment; disclosure requirements enhance technological knowledge and spur further research; incentives to develop and commercialize research rapidly diffuse advancements (Machlup, 1958 (Machlup, , 1968 Penrose, 1951) . These accounts according to Menel (2009) emphasize a reward theory, seeing the appropriability of economic returns from investment as the driving force behind technological innovation (Oddi, 1996, pp. 275-277; Grady and Alexander, 1992, pp. 310-313) . More recently, a number of scholars have developed more sophisticated theories of how the patent system can best promote social welfare (Kitch 1998 , Oddi 1996 and Dam 1994 .
However, the particular effects of transaction costs on the propensity to patent, on innovation and on innovative activity are still out of sight. In other words, do lower transaction costs also induce innovation and productivity (which in effect spurs wealth and long-run growth)?
In this paper, we exploit the variation in cross-country and cross-firm transaction costs to explain the propensity of firms to innovate. Drawing on a large dataset from European Patent Office (EPO) covering over 15,000 firms from 100 countries over the period 1991-2015, we compute the conditional probabilities of individual firms to acquire a valid patent and construct firm-level propensities to innovate, and examine whether lower transaction costs encourage firm-level innovation. Our empirical strategy specifically controls for firm-level idiosyncrasies, country-level unobserved effects and common technology shocks that potentially invoke omitted variable bias in the conditional effects of transaction costs on the propensity to patent. Using a large and detailed dataset on the distribution and level of transaction costs across countries, this paper sets to examine the marginal effects of higher transaction costs on the firm-level propensity to patent. In essence, our research hypotheses can be summarized as follows: o H1: Lower transaction costs induce firm-level innovation o H2: Transaction costs affecting corporate governance, property rights and contract enforcement are relatively more important for innovation than administrative transaction costs Information and the knowledge developed on its basis lie at the heart of innovation activities. As Jorde and Teece argue, an innovation is a simultaneous, continuous interplay between various stages, and innovation often requires lateral or horizontal linkages (very often informal, coincidental or continuous) in addition to vertical relations (Jorde & Teece, 1990 , 1993 . Moreover, as they argue, for innovations to be commercialised the economic system must somehow assemble all the relevant complementary assets and create an interactive and dynamically efficient system of learning and information exchange. Information exchange and knowledge flows, not only within firms but also amongst them, are gaining in importance. Firms nowadays are basing more of their own innovation on knowledge assets lying beyond their boundaries (so-called "open innovation", (see Box, 2009 )) and empirical evidence shows that firms heavily involved in networking outperform the ones that make limited use of their networks (Havnes & Senneseth, 2001) . Firms in innovation networks quite significantly exchange not only technological knowledge but also managerial and market knowledge, where the latter includes competences and know-how on customers' characteristics, preferences and needs (Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008) . One of the types of open innovation that has become increasingly popular recently is co-opetition, namely, simultaneous co-operation and competition between firms (Devi R. Gnyawali & Park, 2009; D. R. Gnyawali & Park, 2011) .
Moreover, the economic literature for example recognises entrepreneurship as another relevant crucial factor in economic development (for a synthesis, see Morlacchi, 2007) . The focus of the research on entrepreneurship in management and business studies is on the processes of the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities and their effect on the creation of new undertakings (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) . According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur's main function is combining new things or innovating, introducing a new product or new quality in a product, a new method of production, a new market, or a new organisation within an industry (Schumpeter, 1934 (Schumpeter, , 1949 . The notions of entrepreneurship and innovation are clearly interrelated and obviously the amount of innovation would be substantially lower without the role and function of the entrepreneur (see for example Brouwer, 2000) .
If information and knowledge flows are crucial for innovation and entrepreneurship, so are competitive markets. The common view that is reflected in policy initiatives -that competition is necessary since it encourages new entries and keeps incumbents on their toes, forcing them to innovate -is contradicted by the theoretical industrial organisation literature and growth theories, whereas micro-econometric empirical studies of the issue in the 1990s only added to the confusion (Aghion & Griffith, 2005) . Aghion and Griffith proposed an extended theoretical model, confirmed by empirical testing, that integrated some of the key insights from the various theories, taking into account that competition affects both pre-and post-innovation rents. They conclude that product market competition will have opposite effects on frontier and laggard sectors; innovation in sectors in which firms are close to the technological frontier will react positively to an increase in competition where innovation reacts less positively or even negatively in sectors in which firms are further below the technological frontier (Aghion & Griffith, 2005) .
Our work contributes to this law and economics literature by considering the interrelationships between propensity to patent, innovative activity and transaction costs generated by different legal systems. Employing factor analysis, we establish four latent indices of transaction costs with high internal consistency that exhibit the maximum common variation across firms and countries. First, administrative transaction costs capture the ease of starting economic activity and the difficulty of dealing with licenses and permits in the contact with government officials. Second, procedural transaction costs capture the strength of contract enforcement and security of property rights. Third, cross-border transaction costs capture the difficulty of international trade. And fourth, information disclosure-related transaction costs capture the extent of information disclosure to the shareholders, quality and transparency of corporate governance, and minority shareholder protection against the corporate boards.
Our investigation suggests higher transaction costs across firms and countries systematically account for the failure of firms to acquire a valid patent. The results reveal that higher transaction costs across firms, between and within countries are associated with a marked drop in the firm-level propensity to patent. The propensity to innovate and acquire a valid patent is significantly more likely to decrease when high procedural and intra-firm transaction costs persist. Firms are systematically less likely to acquire a valid patent at EPO when the procedures to start economic activity and deal with permits and licenses are too complex. On the other hand, shorter duration of business registration procedures, lower costs of dealing with licenses, loose minimum capital requirements and lower costs of firm registration fail to induce firm-level probability to acquire a valid patent and tend to be associated with widespread moral hazard and opportunism as the patent rejection rate tend to increase substantially when these particular transaction costs are reduced.
Lower procedural transaction costs related to contract enforcement and security of property rights are associated with a significant rise in the conditional probability to acquire a valid patent, suggesting the reduction of such costs tends to deter moral hazard and opportunism and is the critical institutional component in inducing innovation. Greater extent of legal rights in getting credit tends to improve the firm-level odds of acquiring a valid patent whereas in-depth credit information requirements can reduce the propensity to patent. In addition, more complex tax legislation and tax payment procedures, and higher costs of cross-border trade, tend to decrease the propensity to acquire a valid patent while greater protection of creditors in the insolvency proceedings and low-cost enforcement of contracts tend to substantially boost the firm-level innovation propensities and explain a greater proportion of the variation in the patenting activities than administrative and cross-border transaction costs combined. Our estimates imply that the proposed estimation strategy correctly predicts between 54 and 60 percent of the patent application outcomes.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and over time, we employ the negative binomial model to examine the contribution of administrative, procedural, cross-border and intra-firm transaction costs to the patenting activity. The results consistently suggest higher administrative transaction costs appear to be associated with persistently higher number of valid patents as such costs tend to address moral hazard, opportunistic behavior and other sources of asymmetric information and deter potential copy-cat imitator firms from entry. On the other hand, higher costs of contract enforcement, property rights protection and shareholder protection are significantly more likely to prevent firm-level innovation and tend to result in markedly lower number of valid patents which suggests that such costs tend to divert the resources from productive uses in unproductive channels exacerbating large losses. The negative effect of higher transaction costs on the number of valid patents and firm-level propensity to patent is robust against multiple exclusion restrictions and specification checks. It appears to be stable over time, across country-specific subsamples and is sensitive to heterogeneity bias and country-level idiosyncrasies. Lastly, the extreme bound analysis is employed to examine the stability of the marginal effects of transaction costs on the propensity to patent by running more than 12 million combinations of regression model specifications and construct the coefficient distributions for clustered and non-clustered indicators of transaction costs. The results confirm the fundamental importance of low-cost contract enforcement, secure property rights and shareholder protection over administrative and cross-border transaction costs in explaining the differential propensities to patent across firms and countries.
The main findings of our investigation are as the following: 1) In terms of administrative costs, duration of procedures appears to be the single most important determinant shaping firm-level innovation. Longer duration of procedures in incorporating the firm, obtaining permits and electricity connection tends to impede innovation whereas higher monetary costs or procedural complexity do not seem to yield a negative effect on firm-level innovation. Lower administrative costs (in monetary terms) spur moral hazard, opportunistic behavior and do not solve information asymmetry between contracting parties whereas lower duration tends to improve firm-level efficiency, hence spurring innovation; 2) Cross-border transaction costs are marginally important but weak determinants of firmlevel innovation. One reason might be that such transactions are not so closely related to IP and innovation; 3) procedural transaction costs (property rights, contracts, creditor protection) matter a great deal for firm-level innovation. Again, the evidence highlights the duration of procedures and costs of property registration as powerful forces behind firm-level innovation as well as the strength of insolvency framework; 4) Corporate governance and conflict of interest-related transaction costs (intra-firm Williamsonian costs) effects on innovation are quantitatively large and very robust. Mechanisms behind more innovation: greater corporate transparency, information disclosure, strength of corporate governance within the firm, conflict of interest regulation and protection of minority shareholders from undue board control and entrenchment.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct the conceptual framework for interpreting the effects of transaction costs on innovation. Section 3 discusses data and methodology while Section 4 discusses the results and presents our main findings and the robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Methods

Patent Applications
Our data on the legal status of patent applications is from European Patent Office's (EPO) PATSTAT database which contains bibliographic and legal status firm-level patent data from leading industrialized and developing countries for the period 1995-2015. Sixteen different forms of legal statues are broadly classified and systematized into four broad categories. The first category entails the patent applications sent to EPO. This category is used to code firm-level observations based on whether the patent application has been submitted to EPO. The second category comprises the pooled firm-level observations for which the patent application has been approved and official validated. This category comprises the firms for which a valid patent has been approved in a given year. The third category comprises the firms whose patent application has been rejected by EPO on various ground which exceed the scope of this paper. And fourth, the remaining forms of legal status were coded into miscellaneous category which amounts to a minor fraction of the whole set of applications and which are omitted from the empirical analysis.
In Table 1 , we present the key descriptive statistics on patent applications and the associated legal status for the core sample comprising 63 countries. For the sake of consistent comparison, small countries are omitted from the table. The key descriptive parameters are based on the patent application data from 8,875 firms from EU and non-EU countries. The total number of patent applications in the period 1995-2015 amounts to 24,362. About 55 percent of the applications have been validated and granted a valid patent. In absolute terms, most applications came from Germany followed by the United States, Italy, and Switzerland while most patent applications were validated for German firms followed by U.S, Swiss, Italian, and French firms. Excluding small and micro states with population less than 100,000, in per applicant firm terms, the highest number of valid patents were approved to the firms originating in South Korea, Switzerland, Japan, Luxembourg, U.S., and Belgium. The least successful countries in terms of the number of valid patents are Bulgaria, Chile, Russia, Croatia, Latvia, and Iceland. The median number of valid patents per applicant firm corresponds to 1.00. Using a similar exclusion criteria, in per capita terms, most valid patents were acquired by the firms originating in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden whereas as the least successful firms in per capita-based patent validation outcomes are from Russia, South Africa, Argentina, Mexico, India, Brazil, and China. Excluding outliers, the median per capita number of valid patents corresponds to 3.24 which lies in the observed range between Czech Republic and South Korea.
Considering the validation outcomes statistics, firms with the highest validation rate are most likely to originate from countries with a low per capita valid patent count such as Estonia, China, Malaysia, Brazil, and South Korea. Excluding small and micro-states, the lowest rate of validation is observed in Greece, Malta, Slovakia, Croatia, Latvia, Iceland, and Albania. The mean patent validation rate in our sample is 0.54 which corresponds to the same level as the one observed for Austria and United Kingdom. Twenty-nine countries, or roughly 46 percent of country-level sample, have validation rates below the median while the validation rate in the remaining 54 percent of the sample is located above the median. The mean rejection rate on patent applications is 40 percent. In percentage terms, firms with the rejection on patent applications are most likely to originate in Iceland, Latvia, Croatia, and Slovakia while the lowest rejection rates are found among firms from Malaysia, China, Estonia and Brazil. Considering the EU subsample, the highest rejection rates are found among firms from Latvia, Croatia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary while the lowest ones are observed in Estonia, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and Poland. Twenty-five countries have the rejection rate below the sample mean which comprises roughly 39 percent of the country-level sample. The descriptive statistics clearly suggests a wide dispersion in patent validation outcomes across firms and countries which indicates the source of heterogeneity in patenting activity which deserves further attention. A widespread variation in patent validation outcomes across firms and countries is further emphasized by the country-level means on the rate of approved patents (validation rate), and on the rejection rate. 
Transaction Costs
The data on transaction costs is from World Bank Doing Business reports. The data on ten different types of transaction costs is matched with each firm in our sample in considering the effects of transaction costs on firm-level innovation and patenting activity. The data on the size and distribution of transaction costs across firms and countries is constructed from the questionnaire responses of local experts indicating the level of various transaction costs in a hypothetical firm's scenario. Since some transaction costs are determined ex-ante and others ex-post, we specifically distinguish between both types of transaction costs and the respective components rather than construct a single aggregate index of transaction costs to provide a detailed insight into how firm-level innovation and patenting respond to change in multiple components of transaction costs rather than to the whole spectrum which is conceptually difficult to operationalize. For each component of transaction costs, we use a linear scaling transformation and construct a single measure of transaction costs:
where  is the scale-normalized k-th indicator of transaction costs ( 1, 
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years. Using a linear-scaling transformation to construct a comparable set of transaction cost indices confers several advantages. First, the extent and size of transaction costs across different operational categories are denoted in different units such as the monetary cost vs. the duration of procedures, which renders the interpretation of the effects on patenting activity and firm-level innovation difficult. Second, rescaling the transaction cost indices allows us to observe and compare the response of patenting outcomes to the change in the size of transaction across countries. And third, such linear rescaling allow for a pronounced insight into the relative importance of different transaction costs for firm-level innovation.
Administrative Transaction Costs
Costs of Starting Business
The costs of starting business are decomposed into three key sources: (i) number of procedures to legally start and operate a company, (ii) time required to complete each procedures, (iii) cost of completing the procedures, and (iv) paid-in minimum capital (Djankov et. al. 2002) . A procedure is defined as any international of the company founders with external parties such as government agencies, lawyers, auditors or notaries. The founders are assumed to complete all the procedures by themselves without intermediaries unless such a party is solicited in practice or required by law. The whole set of procedures covers pre-registration (i.e. name verification, reservation, notarization), registration, and post-registration (i.e. company seal, social security registration) procedures required to formally operate a business. Time to complete each procedure is recorded in calendar days and captures the median duration that incorporation lawyers or notaries indicate it is necessary in practice to complete a procedure with a minimum follow-up with government agencies. It does not include time spent on gathering information, no prior contact with the officials takes place, and each procedure starts on a separate day except for the procedures that start online. The cost of starting business covers only the official costs such as official fees, fees for legal and professional services is required by law or usually held in practice. Fees for purchasing and legalizing company books are included if these transactions are required by law. The cost estimate excludes bribes and unofficial payments. Paid-in minimum capital reflects the amount to be deposited in a bank or with a notary before registration or up to three months after the incorporation, and is calculated as the percentage of per capita income. Cost of starting business and paid-in minimum capital requirements are denoted in terms of per capita income.
Costs of Dealing with Construction Permits
The costs of dealing with construction permits are denoted into three categories: (i) number of procedures to legally build a warehouse, (ii) time required to complete each procedure, and (iii) cost required to complete each procedure. A procedure is any interaction of the company's employees or managers, or any external party acting on behalf of the company, with external parties, including government agencies, notaries, the land register, the cadaster, utility companies, and public inspectors, hired private inspectors, and technical managers. All procedures that are legally required, or that are done in practice by the majority of firms to build a warehouse are counted even though they might be avoided in exceptional cases. The procedures encompass submitting all relevant documents and obtaining all necessary clearances, licenses, permits, and certificates, submitting all required notifications, and receiving necessary inspections, obtaining utility connections for water and sewerage, and registering the warehouse after its completion if this is required for use as a collateral or for transfer of the warehouse. The time required to complete each procedure excludes time spent gathering information, and each procedure starts on a separate day. A procedure is considered complete once the final document is received and no prior contact with officials is assumed. The cost required to complete each procedure is denote in terms of warehouse value percentage whereupon only official costs are considered excluding bribes.
Costs of Paying Taxes
Three indicators of the costs of paying taxes are considered: (i) number of tax payments, (ii) time required to comply with three major taxes, and (iii) total tax rate ). The number of tax payments reflect the total number of taxes and contributions paid, including consumption taxes, and the method and frequency of filing and payment where electronic filings are taken into account. Time required to comply with three major taxes is recorded in hours per year. It takes into account collecting information, and computing the tax payable, completing tax return forms, filing with proper agencies, arranging payment or withholding, and preparing separate mandatory tax accounting books, if required. Filing time includes the time to complete all necessary tax return forms and file the relevant returns at the tax authority. The time to pay considers the hours needed to make the payment online or in person. Where taxes and contributions need to be paid in person, the time includes delays while waiting. The total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions borne by the firm in the second year of operation, and is expressed as a share of commercial profit. The total tax amount is the sum of all the different taxes and contributions payable after deductions and allowances are subtracted, and can be divided into five categories: corporate income tax, social contributions and labor taxes paid by the employer, property and property transfer tax, dividend, capital gains and financial transactions taxes, waste collection, vehicle, road, and other taxes.
Costs of Electricity Connection
The costs of getting electricity connection are composed of three major categories: (i) number of procedures, (ii) time required to complete each procedure, and (iii) cost required to complete the procedures, based on Geginat and Ramalho (2015) . A procedure is defined as any interaction between the company's employees or its main electrical engineer with external parties such as electricity distribution utility, electricity supply utilities, government agencies, electrical contractors and electrical firms. The whole set of procedures to obtain electricity connection consists of submitting all relevant documents, obtaining all necessary clearances and permits, completing all required notifications and receiving all necessary inspections, obtaining external installation works including purchasing the material for these works, concluding any necessary supply contract and obtaining final supply. The time of completing the procedures is recorded in calendar days. It captures the duration that electrical utility and experts indicate is necessary in practice rather than required by law to complete the given set of procedures with a minimum follow-up and no extra payments. Each procedure starts on a separate day assuming at least one calendar day. The duration excludes the time spent gathering information and reflects the time spent on completing the procedures assuming no prior contact with the officials.
Cross-Border Transaction Costs
Costs of International Trade
The costs of cross-border long-distance trade are broken down into three major categories: (i) number of documents to export and import goods, (ii) time to export and import, and (iii) cost of export and import ). The number of documents necessary to export and import encompass the official documents prescribed by fiscal and customs authorities to complete the export or import of goods using the long-distance trade. The time to export and import is measured in hours and takes into account customs clearance, documentary compliance, and border compliance. The cost of export and import measures the total cost associated with domestic transport, border compliance, and documentary compliances. It excludes insurance costs and extra payments for which no receipt is issue. The cost is denoted in U.S dollars.
Procedural Transaction Costs
Costs of Property Registration
The costs of property registration reflect the efficiency and security of transferring property from the buyer to the seller, and is composed of (i) the number of procedures to legally transfer title on immovable property, (ii) time required to complete each procedure, and (ii) cost required to complete each procedure. A procedure is defined as any interaction of the buyer or the seller, and their agents (if required by law or used in practice) with external parties such as government agencies, inspectors, notaries, and lawyers. It is assumed the buyer uses the fastest legal option available and used by the majority of property owners. The number of procedures consists of pre-registration procedures (checking for liens, notarizing sales agreement, payment of property transfer taxes), registration procedures, and post-registration procedures such as filing title with the municipality. The time required to complete each procedure is measured in calendar days and captures the duration property lawyers, notaries or registry officials indicate is necessary to complete a procedure. It excludes time spent gathering information and each procedure starts on a separate day where no prior contact with officials is assumed. The cost of completing procedure is denoted as the percentage of the property value and includes only official costs without extra payments while it excludes the value-added tax or capital gains tax.
Costs of Contract Enforcement
The costs of contract enforcement reflect the efficiency and costliness of resolving a commercial dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant (Djankov et. al. 2003) The cost is broken down into three major categories: (i) number of procedures to legally enforce a contract, (ii) time required to enforce a contract through the courts, and (iii) costs required to enforce a contract through the courts. The whole set of procedures encompasses procedures associated with filing the lawsuit, serving the case, judicial trial, obtaining judgement and the enforcement of judgement. The time to enforce a contract is measured in calendar days counted from the moment the plaintiff decides to file a lawsuit in court until final payment. The duration includes the days when actions occur and the waiting period in between. Therefore, the overall duration consists of the completion of process service, issuance of judgment, and the recovery of the claim value through the public sale which is denoted as the time for the enforcement of the judgement. The monetary cost of enforcing the contract through courts is measured as a percentage of the claim and consists of three types: court costs, enforcement costs, and average attorney fees. Court costs include the costs the plaintiff must advance to the court regardless of the final cost. This includes the fee to be paid to obtain an expert opinion. Enforcement costs comprise the costs the plaintiff must advance to enforce the judgement through a public sale of buyer's movable assets regardless of the final cost. Attorney fees reflect the fees the plaintiff must advance to the local attorney to represent it in the standardized case. Bribes and extra payment for which no receipt is issued are not taken into account.
Costs of Resolving Insolvent Firms
The costs of resolving insolvent firms reflect the recovery of debt in insolvency by the creditor . Specifically, eight different indicators are considered: (i) number of procedures in resolving insolvency dispute, (ii) time required to recover debt, (iii) cost required to recover debt, (iv) recovery rate for secured creditors, (v) quality of management of debtor's assets, (vi) insolvency reorganization proceedings index, (vii) creditor participation indent, and (viii) strength of insolvency framework. The number of procedures in resolving insolvency dispute reflects the procedures creditor must undertake to recover the debt from the insolvent firm. Time required to recover debt is measured in calendar days and is counted from the moment of company's default until the payment of some or all of the money owed to the bank. It includes potential delay tactics by the parties such as filing of dilatory appeals or extension requests. The cost of the proceedings is recorded as a percentage value of the debtor's estate and includes court fees, government levies, insolvency administration fees, auctioneer fees, assessor fees, attorney fees, and some other related fees. The recovery rate is measured as cents on the dollar recovered by secured creditors through reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement proceedings. The rate includes the outcome whether the business emerges from the proceedings as a going concern or the assets are sold piecewise, and is based on the present value of debt recovered. Official costs of the insolvency proceedings are appropriately deducted whereas the depreciation of the equipment is taken into account. Management of debtor's assets index reflects the degree to which insolvent company stakeholders recover the debt from the company such as the continuation and rejection of contracts during the insolvency, avoidance of preferential and undervalued transactions, and post-commencement financial management. The index ranges from 0 to 6 where higher values indicate more advantageous treatment of the assets from the perspective of stakeholders, and henceforth lower transaction costs. Insolvency reorganization proceedings index reflects the difficulty of approving the content of the reorganization plan such as whether the plan is voted on only by creditors whose rights are affected by the plain, whether creditors entitled to vote on the plan are divided into classes, and whether the insolvency framework requires that dissenting creditors receive as much under the reorganization plan as they would have received in liquidation. The index ranges from 0 to 3 where higher values indicate greater compliance with internationally accepted practices, thus lower transaction costs. Creditor participation index consists of four components: participation of creditors in the selection of an insolvency representative, whether creditors are required to approve the sale of substantial assets of the debtor in insolvency proceedings, whether an individual creditor has the right to access financial information about the debtor during the proceedings, and whether the individual creditor can object the decision of the court or insolvency representative to approve or reject the claim against the debtor brought by the creditor itself. The index ranges from 0 to 4 and indicates the creditor participation and rights during the liquidation and reorganization proceedings. Strength of insolvency framework is an aggregate of the scores on commencement of proceedings index, management of debtor's assets index, reorganization proceedings index and creditor participation index. It is ranged from 0 to 16 where higher values indicate lower transaction costs, i.e. better design of insolvency law and its factual implementation for rehabilitating viable firms and liquidating nonviable ones.
Corporate Governance-Related Transaction Costs
The transaction costs related to corporate governance measure the degree to which shareholders are protected from the conflict of interest, and the rights of shareholders in corporate governance. Such costs are inevitably related to the level of transaction costs inside the firm (QUOTE: Williamson, Masten???) and indicate the costliness of resolving and mitigating the conflicts of interest as well as the strength of corporate governance. The costs of corporate governance and conflict of interest are broken down into eight categories.
Information Disclosure Requirement
The information disclosure requirement index is based on five different components: (i) which corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for the transaction, (ii) whether it is required that an external body reviews the transaction before it takes place, (iii) whether disclosure by the owner to the board of directors or the supervisory board is required, (iv) whether immediate disclosure of the transaction to the public, the regulator or the shareholders is required, and (v) whether disclosure in the annual report is required. The index ranges from 0 to 10 where higher values indicate greater disclosure and lower transaction costs.
Liability for Self-Dealing
The extent of director's liability index for self-dealing reflects minority shareholders' ability to sue and hold liable interested directors for prejudicial related-party transactions, and the available legal remedies such as damages, disgorgement of profits, fines, imprisonment, rescission of transactions. The index consists of seven components: (i) whether shareholder plaintiffs are able to sue directly for the damage the transaction causes to the company, (ii) whether the shareholder plaintiff is able to hold the owner liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company, (iii) whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold the approving body (CEO, board of directors, or supervisory board) liable for the damage stemming from the transaction, (iv) whether the owner pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff, (v) whether the owner is fined and imprisoned or disqualified upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff, (vi) whether the owner repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff, (vii) whether a court can void the transaction upon the successful claim by the plaintiff. The index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating greater liability of directors.
Shareholder Suits
The ease of shareholder suits is centered around three major categories: access to internal documents upon the suit, obtainable evidence during the trial, and the allocation of legal expenses. The index contains six components: (i) whether shareholders owning 10% of the company's share capital have the right to inspect the transaction documents before filing suit or request that a government inspector investigate the transaction without filing suit, (ii) what range of documents is availible to the shareholder plaintiff from the defendant and witnesses during trial, (iii) whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of relevant documents from the defendant without identifying each document specifically, (iv) whether the plaintiff can directly examine the defendant and witnesses during the trial, (v) whether the standard of proof for civil suits is lower than for a criminal case, and vi) whether shareholder plaintiffs can recover their legal expenses from the company. A ten-point index is constructed with higher values indicating greater de facto power of shareholders to challenge the transaction.
Conflict of Interest Regulation
The extent of conflict of interest regulation is a simple unweighted average of extent of information disclosure, extent of director liability, and ease of shareholder suits index. The index corresponds to 0
Shareholder Rights
The extent of shareholder rights index measures the rights and role of shareholders in major corporate decisions and consists of ten key components: (i) whether the sale of the majority of assets requires the shareholder approval, (ii) whether the shareholders representing 10% of the share capital have the right to call for an extraordinary meeting of shareholders, (iii) whether shareholders' approval is necessary every time new shares are issued, (iv) whether shareholders automatically receive preemption or subscription rights every time new shares are issued, (v) whether the election and dismissal of the external auditor must be approved by the shareholders, (vi) whether changes to the voting rights of a class of shares must be approved only by the holders of the affected shares, (vii) whether the sale of the majority of assets requires the shareholder approval for a limited company, (viii) whether the shareholders representing 10% of the share capital have the right to call for an extraordinary meeting of shareholders for a limited company, and (ix) whether approval must be obtained from shareholders every time new shares are issued, and (x) whether preemption or subscription rights are automatically received every time new shares are issued in case of a limited company. The index is in the range between 0 and 10 where higher values indicate greater extent of shareholder rights.
Strength of Corporate Governance
The strength of corporate governance measures safeguards protecting shareholders from undue board control and entrenchment. The index consists of seven original components reflecting this particular dimension of low-cost good corporate governance: (i) whether the CEO is prohibited from being the chair of the board of directors, (ii) whether the board of directors must include independent and nonexecutive board members, (iii) whether members of the board of directors can be removed without cause by shareholders before the end of their term, (iv) whether the board if directors must include a separate audit committee, (v) whether a potential acquiring company must draft a tender offer to all shareholders upon the acquisition, (vi) whether dividends must be paid within a maximum period set by law after the declaration date, and (vii) whether a subsidiary is barred from acquiring shares issued by its parent company. The last three indices are also evaluated for the limited company as the acquiring firm. The index ranges from 0 to 10 where higher values indicate stronger safeguards and protection against undue board control and entrenchment.
Corporate Transparency
The extent of corporate transparency index measures the transparency on ownership stakes, compensation, audits and financial prospects. The index consists of ten components reflecting the degree of corporate transparency: (i) whether direct and indirect beneficial ownership stakes representing at least 5% must be disclosed, (ii) whether information about board members' other directorships and the basic data on their primary employment must be disclosed, (iii) whether compensation of individual managers must be disclosed, (iv) whether a detailed notice of general meeting must be sent 30 days before the meeting, (v) whether shareholders representing 5% of share capital can put items on the agenda for the general meeting, (vi) whether annual financial statement must be audited by an external auditor, and (vii) whether the audit reports must be disclosed to the public. The last three criteria are also being evaluated if the acquiring firm is a limited company. The index ranges from 0 to 10 where higher values indicate greater corporate transparency, and lower transaction costs.
Minority Investors' Protection
The strength of minority investor protection index is computed as a simple unweighted average of the conflict of interest regulation index and shareholder governance index with higher values indicating stronger minority investor institutional protection and a source of low transaction costs.
In Table 2 , the key descriptive statistics on the size and distribution of firm-level transaction costs is reported. The parameter estimates include the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values alongside the respective 25th and 75th percentile thresholds. In Panel A, the parameters on the administrative transaction costs are presented. In Panel B, cross-border transaction costs are examined while in Panel C, the key parameters are estimated for procedural transaction costs associated with property rights and contract. Lastly, in Panel D, the firm-level parameters on intra-firm transaction costs associated with corporate governance and conflict of interests are presented. 
Empirical Methods
The aim of empirical strategy is to examine the contribution of transaction costs to patenting activity and firm-level innovation consistently. The basic negative binomial fixed-effects relationship between the number of patents applied for by a firm at EPO and transaction costs that takes places is:
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Specifically, our interest lies not in the estimated coefficients from Eq. (3) but in the marginal effects of the change in transaction costs on the validation of patent application. The marginal effects clearly indicate not only whether transaction costs might induce firm-level innovation but also how much a hypothetical change in transaction costs would affect the patenting activity. Taking the first-order derivative of Eq. (3) through transaction cost covariate leads to:
which denotes the partial marginal effect of the change in transaction costs from the initial level
We establish the probabilistic model of patent validation to determine how much an exogenous change in transaction costs determines the probability that the patent application is approved or rejected. Our outcome of interest is a simply binary variable indicating whether the patent application of i-th firm from j-th country at time t has been approved or rejected which self-suggests the following outcome distribution scheme: 
Using the potential outcome distribution from Eq. (5), we examine the effects of transaction costs on the patent validation decision using a simple unconstrained logit model with fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity:
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where    is the underlying cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution. A valid inference on the key parameters of interest can be undermined in the patent residuals in Eq. (6) are correlated across firms, and subsequently across countries which depends on the number of specified clusters which renders the estimated key parameters inconsistent. The failure to control for withincluster correlation can cause substantially underestimated standard errors which implies that the null hypotheses might be over-rejected as indicated by Moulton (1986 Moulton ( , 1990 . Serially correlated residuals within the cluster do not disappear once the various sources of unobserved effects are controlled for (Davis 2002 , Pepper 2002 , Bertrand et. al. 2004 , Kezdi 2004 . Controlling for unobserved effects in the three-dimensional panel, we address the within-cluster residual correlation using a non-nested multiway clustering scheme (Cameron et. al. 2011 ) and cluster the standard errors simultaneously at firm level, country level and year level based on multiway error component model under i.i.d. residual distribution assumption. Compared to one-way clustering scheme aiming for robust standard errors using Huber (1967) , Eicker (1967) and White (1980) , the non-nested multiway clustering estimator permits the valid inference in the presence of within-cluster residual correlation compared to one-way clustering scheme. (White 1984 , Pfefferman and Nathan 1981 , Liang and Zeger 1986 , Arellano 1987 , Wooldridge 2002 , 2003 , Cameron and Trivedi 2005 , Hansen 2007 ). The non-nested multiway clustering scheme on the empirical distribution function ensures that the model parameters are robust against arbitrary heteroscedasticity and serially correlated stochastic disturbances at three different levels of aggregation.
Results
In Table 3 , the marginal effects of the change in transaction costs on the firm-level innovation are presented using the number of valid EPO patents as the outcome variable. Each model specification is estimated using the negative binomial and Poisson model to check for the potential discrepancy arising from the variance overdispersion relative to the mean valid patent count. Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients on the costs of starting business. The evidence clearly suggest higher costs of starting economic activity do not exert a systematic and statistically discernable effect on the level of innovation. The estimated responses of the valid patents to the change in cost of starting business are not statistically significantly different from zero even at artificially high significance levels even after addressing the overdispersion in the valid patent count. In columns (2) and (3), the effects of costs of dealing with construction permits are report. The evidence does not advocate greater number of procedures in obtaining permits or higher per capita income cost of dealing with permits would deter firm-level innovation. A change in the duration of dealing with procedures exhibits a strong and powerful effect on firm-level innovation. The point estimate from column (4) implies that a hypothetical decrease in the duration of dealing with construction permits by 1 percent would increase by the firm-level valid number of patents by 0.8 percent holding everything else fixed. Columns (5) and (6) report the effects of the costs of getting electricity connection to the firm-level innovation. Increasing the number of administrative procedures to obtain the electricity connection by 1 percent would decrease the valid number of patents at EPO by 0.4 percent at marginal significance threshold (p-value = 0.11). A similar 1 percent increase in the duration of obtaining electricity connection would yield 0.3 percent decrease in the number of valid patents whereas shifting the costs of obtaining electricity connection relative to per capita income would not systematically affect firm-level innovation. In columns (7) and (8), the marginal effects of property registration costs are displayed. Controlling for the potential over-dispersion in patent variance across firms, the evidence suggests greater duration of property registration procedures tends to discourage firm-level innovation. In a hypothetical scenario, expanding the duration of property registration procedures by 1 percent would decrease the firm-level valid patent count by 1.1 percent at 5% significance level, respectively. The established effects does not depend on the model selection and is sensitivity to the over-dispersion. An induced change in the number of procedures and the associated cost of property registration do not seem to exert a statistically significant effect on firm-level innovation even after netting out the patent overdispersion.
Lowering the costs of getting credit is not associated with a marked improvement in firm-level innovation given the evidence from columns (9) and (10). Strengthening the legal rights and greater information depth on the firm's borrowing history appears to be associated with a slight increase in the number of valid patents. More accessible credit information and the greater depth of information in the public credit registry appear to be related with a marginal decrease in the firm-level valid patent count. In both cases, the effects are bound to zero which does not disappear even at 15% significance level. In columns (11) and (12), the effects of transaction costs associated with firm-level corporate governance on innovation are examined. The evidence clearly suggests not all corporate governance transaction costs are created equal as some of them systematically shape the level of innovative across firms while others fail to do so. Expanding the extent of information disclosure for related-party transactions does not appear to be associated with greater intensity of firm-level innovation and neither does greater ability of minority shareholders to sue and hold directors liable for pre-judicial transactions, including the extent of disposable legal remedies. Neither easier suits by shareholders nor deeper regulation of intra-firm conflict of interest tend to foster the frequency and intensity firm-level innovation to a significant degree. The point estimates on both coefficients are not statistically different from zero which implies that neither further mitigation of conflict of interest within the firm nor greater ease of shareholder suits enhance the acquisition of at least one valid patent at EPO. On the other hand, expanding the extent of shareholders' rights and role in major corporate decisions is associated with a marked improvement in the ability to acquire a valid patent. One basis point improvement in shareholder rights index is associated with an increase in the number of valid patents between 13.3 percent and 13.6 percent, respectively within 5% significance threshold, indicating an important source of firm-level innovation. Relatedly, improving the overall firm-level strength of corporate governance by each additional basis point is associated with an increase in the valid EPO patent count between 10.1 percent and 10.3 percent, and is significant at 1%, which suggests a pivotal importance of contractual mechanisms inside the firms in shaping their innovation capacity. Enhancing corporate transparency on ownership stakes, compensation, audits and financial prospects plays a major role in shaping the firm-level innovation capacity. Increasing the extent of corporate transparency within firms by one basis point triggers a marginal increase in the number of valid patents between 11.4 percent and 11.7 percent holding everything else fixed. The estimated effect is statistically significant at 1%, respectively. On the other hand, a combined improvement in the firmlevel innovation capacity could be undermined by the extent of shareholder governance since our evidence suggests an excessive control of corporate decision-making by shareholders can stifle the innovation capacity. For instance, a one basis point increase in the extent of shareholders governance index is associated with economically large and statistically significant decrease in the EPO-valid patent count between 29.5 percent and 29.9 percent. Therefore, a hypothetical firm expanding the shareholders governance rather than the role in major corporate decisions, can expect a marked decline in its capacity to innovate. Such powerful effects concisely suggests the fundamental importance of firm-level corporate governance in shaping the intensity of innovation across firms.
In columns (13) and (14), no evidence is found to support the notion that making paying taxes more difficult and costlier impairs the ability of firms to innovate and acquire at least one valid patent at EPO. The effect of paying taxes is bound to zero and statistically insignificant at artificially high levels either when the transaction costs of paying taxes are measured through the number of firm-level tax payments per year, number of hours required to pay taxes or through the total tax rate in the share of commercial profit. Columns (15) and (16) report the effects of higher cross-border transaction costs on the frequency and intensity of innovation. The evidence suggests a negligible role of such costs in fostering or hindering firm-level innovation. A marked and significant negative effect is indicated by the greater duration to import goods where 1 percent increase in the length of import duration is associated with 6.6 percent decrease in the number of valid EPO patents where the effect tends to amplify once the overdispersion is addressed. In columns (17) and (18), the effects of contract enforcement on innovation are presented. Contrary to cross-border transaction costs, increasing such costs would have two opposite effects on the capacity to innovate. For example, greater duration of enforcing a contract between two parties by 1 percentage point would, according to our estimates, decrease the number of valid patents by 2% suggest a modest effect which is statistically significant at 5%.
Whereas the monetary cost of enforcing a contract through a lawsuit does not appear to be associated with the acquisition of a valid patent, a 10 percentage point increase in the number of procedures to enforcement a contract is equivalent to a 4 percent decline in the EPO-validated patenting activity which does not appear to be driven by the cross-firm overdispersion parameter. In columns (19) and (20), the effects of costs of resolving insolvent firms on firm-level innovation are displayed. Several findings follow from the evidence. First, greater duration of insolvency proceedings does not seem to shape the capacity of firms to acquire at least one EPO-validated patent to a large degree. Second, increasing the costs of resolving insolvent firms hypothetically by 10 percentage points is expected to yield a 5 percent decline in the EPO-validated patenting activity although the established marginal effect tends to be weak and only borderline significant with p-value = 0.11. Third, improving de facto creditor protection through higher recovery rate on debtor's proceedings exhibits a large and powerful effect -a 1 percentage point increase in the recovery rate is associated with 0.5 percent increase in the EPO-validated firm-level patent count. Fourth, improving the quality and efficiency of managing debtor's assets yield an equally large, strong and beneficial effect on patenting activity with an elastic response since one basis point improvement in the debtor's management quality index is associated with 0.17 percent increase in the validated patents at EPO. Fifth, although the proceedings from insolvency organization might not be pivotal in shaping the innovation capacity across firms, creditors' participation and their rights during the liquidation and reorganization proceedings tend to downscore the innovation potential. Accordingly, one basis point increase in the creditor participation is associated with 0.1 percent decrease in the number of EPO-validated patents. And sixth, perhaps not surprisingly, the overall de jure and de facto legal strength of the insolvency framework exhibits a systematic and non-random relationship with firm-level innovation. Our evidence from both columns clearly implies that strengthening the insolvency framework by one basis point is expected to yield 0.4 percent increase in the level of EPO-validated patents holding the effects of firm-unobserved covariates fixed. effects of transaction costs on firm-level innovation. The outcome variable is the number of EPO-validated patents in a given year. Each specification is estimated with and without the overdispersion parameter using the maximum likelihood estimator based on Cameron and Trivedi (2013) and Long and Freese (2014) conditional expectation function. The table reports the marginal effects of a unit change in transaction costs on the occurance of EPO-validated patents. Standard errors are clustered on firm level to allow for arbitrary heteroskedastic distribution of random error variance and serially correlated stochastic disturbances across firms using Huber-Eickner-White variance-covariance matrix estimator. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Asterisks denote statistically significant marginal effects at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***), respectively.
In Table 4 , the marginal effects of transaction costs on patent validation outcomes are presented based on the estimated binary response model from Eq. (6). In each specification, three specific validation outcomes are considered: (i) filing of patent application at EPO, (ii) approval of patent application by granting a valid patent by EPO, and (iii) rejection of patent application by EPO. For each outcome, a binary outcome variable is constructed that corresponds to the validation outcome distribution given by Eq. (6). In each model specification, we control for the confounding influence of time-fixed effects which capture the technology shocks common to all firms across our sample. In columns (1) through (3), the effects of costs of starting business on validation outcomes are examined. The evidence suggests such costs matter a great deal for the patent validation outcomes. Greater procedural complexity in starting business is associated with a marked increase in the probability of filing a patent application whereas greater duration of procedures required to start business tends to decrease the probability of filing patent application. Higher monetary costs of incorporation relative to per capita income and more stringent minimum capital requirements exert a significantly negative effect on patent application. The negative effect of incorporation costs is quantitatively as large as the negative effect of greater procedural duration whereas the negative effect of more stringent minimum capital requirements is larger than the former two effects combined. In particular, increasing the minimum capital requirements by 1% makes it 1.7 percent less probable that the patent application is file which both quantitatively large and statistically significant at 10%. In columns (2) and (3), the evidence clearly suggests such costs do not exhibit a large and discernable effect on patent application outcomes either on the approval of validity or on the probability of rejection.
In columns (4) through (6), the effects of costs of dealing with construction permits are displayed. The evidence consistently suggests such costs largely determine the firm-level probability of filing an application. Greater procedural complexity tends encourage the patent application filing whereas greater duration of procedures in dealing with construction permits tends to discourage it. On the other hand, higher costs of dealing with permits are associated with a marked increase in the probability of filing a patent application which suggests that firms' propensity to file an application responds strongly to the change in such administrative transaction costs. Despite its small magnitude, the effect is statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. In column (5), the evidence shows that among these costs, greater procedural complexity is expected to downsize the probability of acquiring a valid patent at EPO, suggesting its importance in shaping the innovation capacity, whereas changing the costs of dealing with permits and duration of procedures is not associated with such a large and significant increase in the probability of valid patent acquisition. Based on the point estimate in column (6), each additional procedure in dealing with permits is expected to increase the odds of rejecting the patent application by 0.05 percentage points which appears to be small but nonetheless statistically significant at 10%. Columns (7) through (9) report the effects of costs of getting electricity connection on the patent validation outcomes. Patent application is significantly more likely upon more complex procedures to obtain electricity connection, and much less likely when the duration of procedures to obtain the connection is too lengthy. In addition, greater costs of getting the connection stifle the odds of patent application by 0.3 percentage points following a 1% increase in the cost relative to per capita income. In columns (8) and (9), the evidence consistently suggests a hypothetical reduction in the costs of getting electricity is not expected to yield a discernable increase in the firm-level probability of acquiring a valid patent and neither does such a reduction influence the probability of rejection.
In columns (10) through (12), the effects of property registration costs are examined. The evidence clearly suggests more complex procedures and costlier registration procedures tend to enlarge the probability of filing an application since the potentially innovative firms typically encounter more complex registration procedures and higher costs than firms not specialized in innovative-intensive sectors. Greater duration of the property registration procedures tends to systematically decrease the probability of filing an application whereupon the effect is quantitatively larger than the combined effect of procedural complexity and monetary costs of registration procedures. In particular, expanding the duration of property registration procedures by 10 percentage points is associated with a decrease in the probability of filing a patent application by 5 percent holding everything else fixed. In column (11), the propensity to acquire a valid patent responds negatively to more complex property registration procedures which suggests that greater complexity tends to restrains rather than promote firm-level innovation. Contrary to column (10), greater duration of property registration procedures is expected to improve the odds of acquiring a valid patent whereas the property registration cost does not seem to play a discernable role in shaping the firm-level probability of acquiring a valid patent. Such map of the effects is further indicated by column (12), suggesting the rejection of patent application is more likely when property registration procedures are too complex and when duration is procedures is too short.
The effects of costs of getting credit on patent validation outcomes are examined in more detail in columns (13) through (15). Greater degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders, and thus facilitate lending, is associated with a marked and significant increase in the probability of filing a patent application, and with a discernable decrease in the probability of rejecting the application whereas there appears to be no effect on the probability of acquiring a valid patent. Expanding the scope, coverage and accessibility of credit information through public register or private bureau facilitates the EPO patent applications, it makes it significantly less likely for a randomly chosen incumbent firm to acquire a valid patent, thereby increasing the odds of rejection. The point estimates from columns (14) and (15) imply that 10 percent increase in the depth of credit information index is expected to downsize the probability of acquiring a valid patent by 1 percent whilst quantitatively similar increase, according to our estimates, yields 0.9 percentage point rise in the probability of rejecting the application. Expanding the information on the firms' and lenders' borrowing history does not seem to influence the probability of patent acquisition and rejection to a large and discernable degree. Our estimation strategy correctly predicts 95 percent of the patent application filings, 72 percent of patent acquisitions, and 73 percent of patent application rejections.
In Table 5 , the remaining five categories of transaction costs and the corresponding effects on firmlevel patenting propensities are examined. Columns (1) through (3) revisit the relationship between the patent validation outcomes and intra-firm corporate governance transaction costs. The evidence suggests that transaction costs inside the firm are one of the central mechanisms behind the probability of filing patent applications. Extending the information disclosure requirements in corporate transactions and greater liability of directors tend to foster the propensity to file a patent application but it does not appear to yield a similar improvement in the propensity to acquire a valid patent, nor does it seem to influence the probability of rejection. Greater ability of shareholders to sue officers and directors for misconduct does not appear to be associated with any of the three outcomes while enhanced regulation of the conflict of interest is associated with a drop in the probability of filing a patent application but does not seem to influence the patent rejection and acquisition propensities. On the other hand, extending shareholders' rights and role in major corporate decisions is associated with a drop in the probability of filing an application, and with a marked and discernable increase in the propensity to acquire a valid patent. Given the point estimate in column (2), 1 percent improvement in the index of shareholders' rights is expected to yield a 1.9 percentage points increase in the probability of acquiring a valid patent holding everything else fixed. In addition, greater extent of corporate transparency on ownership stakes, compensation, audits and financial prospects yields a similar drop in the probability of filing an application, and a notable increase in the propensity to acquire a valid patent. In particular, 1 percent improvement in the index of corporate transparency yields 1.7 percent rise in the propensity to acquire a valid patent which is both quantitatively large and statistically significant at 5%. An equivalent improvement is set to yield 1.3 decrease in the probability of patent reject at borderline significant (p-value = 0.13). Surprisingly, the overall strength of shareholder governance is associated with (i) an increase in the probability of filing an application, (ii) a decrease in the propensity to acquire a valid patent, and with (iii) an increase in the probability of rejection, whereas greater strength of minority investor protection favors the application probability but not the specific validation outcome per se.
Columns (4) though (6) examine the effects of costs of paying taxes. The evidence suggests changing such administrative transaction costs is set to influence to odds of filing an application whereas there appears to be no effect on the propensity to acquire a valid patent or on the probability of rejection. A notable exception is the duration of paying taxes where a hypothetical 1 percent increase in the duration of paying taxes is associated with 0.3 percent decrease in the probability of filing a patent application, and with 0.2 percentage point increase in the probability of rejection. In columns (7) through (9), the evidence also confirms the relevance of cross-border transaction costs for patent application whereupon greater number of export documents tends to decrease the odds of acquiring a valid patent significantly, hence, increasing the probability of rejection. In columns (10) through (12), the effects of contract enforcement costs are examined. The results highlight the peculiar importance of contract enforcement costs in facilitating patent application but deny its significance in explaining the propensity to acquire a valid patent. Greater duration of contract enforcement procedures by 10 percent is, accordingly, associated with 0.2 percentage point decrease in the patent application probability while a similar increase in the cost of contract enforcement is set to boost the patent application by 2 percent. The latter effect appears to be stronger than the combined effect of the procedural complexity and duration. In columns (11) and (12), no evidence is found to support the claim that contract enforcement cost influence the propensity to acquire a valid patent.
Finally, in columns (13) through (15), the effects of contract enforcement costs on patent validation outcomes are presented. The results suggests firms are significantly more likely to acquire a valid patent when the cost of resolving insolvent firms is not too low but not when the insolvency procedures are more complex. Greater cost of resolving insolvency tends to exacerbate a marked drop in the probability of patent application whereas better reorganization of insolvency proceedings is expected to yield a notable increase in the patenting activity. No peculiar effects of creditor participation or management of debtor's assets on firm-level propensity to acquire a valid patent are found which highlights limited effects of such costs.
In essence, our results suggests transaction costs exhibit a first-order effect on the ability of firms to acquire a valid patent. Lower transaction costs do not necessarily always lead to greater propensity to acquire a valid patent. Based on our results, the acquisition of the valid patent and firm-level innovation requires the following transaction cost equilibrium: simple and un-complex procedures in dealing with construction permits and in the property registration, a limited information disclosure by the firm in the credit contract between the lender and the firm, strong rights and role of shareholders in major corporate decisions, strong and continuously strengthened de facto corporate governance framework within the firm, transparent corporate transaction, absence of shareholders' excessive control over the corporate boards, simple international trade procedures, longer duration of resolving insolvent firms, and relatively longer duration of property registration. The latter two clearly represent higher transaction costs and potentially reflect that such procedures for innovation-intensive firms are by longer by default. On the other hand, quick procedures might not always be beneficial since this might indicate poor quality and non-transparent decision-making that might lead to sub-optimum resource allocation ex-post.
Extreme Bounds of Transaction Costs
Are transaction costs robust determinants of the firm-level innovation? We assess the robustness of the established effects of transaction costs on the propensity to acquire a valid patent from Table 4 using the extreme bounds analysis (Sala-i-Martin 2002). The established effects of transaction costs on the propensity to acquire a valid patent are based on specific point estimates constructed from the conditional expectation function. Any direct inference on the underlying transaction cost parameters holds on average and neglects a battery of specification checks that might render the underlying parameters unreliable as a result of omitted variable bias. In essence, the results from Table 4 do not convey the true model of patenting activity using the variation in transaction costs. Instead of replicating the core logit regressions on subsamples, we examine the entire distribution of coefficients rather than focusing on upper and lower bounds (Leamer 1985, Levine and Renelt 1992) to gauge whether transaction costs robustly explain the variation in patenting activity across and within firms to address wide bounds resulting from low explanatory power inherent in some replicated specifications (Granger and Uhlig 1990) . effects of transaction costs on the patent validation outcomes using a logistic distribution function to estimate the firm-level propensities to file a patent application, acquire a valid patent, and the patent rejection propensity. Standard errors are adjusted for serially correlated stochastic disturbances and heteroskedastic distribution of random error variance allowing for intra-firm residual correlation. Using Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) non-nested multiway clustering scheme for finite-sample adjustment of the empirical distribution function allowing for cluster-robust parameter inference, structural inconsistencies arising from biased Huber-White OLS covariance matrix estimator are addressed. Standard errors are clustered into 8,820 firm clusters, 92 country clusters, and 21 time clusters. Multiway cluster-robust standard errors are denoted in the parentheses for each empirical specification. Asterisks denote statistically significant sample regression coefficients at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***), respectively. Notes: the table reports the marginal effects of transaction costs on the patent validation outcomes using a logistic distribution function to estimate the firm-level propensities to file a patent application, acquire a valid patent, and the patent rejection propensity. Standard errors are adjusted for serially correlated stochastic disturbances and heteroskedastic distribution of random error variance allowing for intra-firm residual correlation. Using Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) non-nested multiway clustering scheme for finite-sample adjustment of the empirical distribution function allowing for cluster-robust parameter inference, structural inconsistencies arising from biased Huber-White OLS covariance matrix estimator are addressed. Standard errors are clustered into 8,829 firm clusters, 92 country clusters, and 21 time clusters. Multiway cluster-robust standard errors are denoted in the parentheses for each empirical specification. Asterisks denote statistically significant sample regression coefficients at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***), respectively. (0)] to examine the fraction of the  coefficients lying inside and outside the given interval. Our model has a total of 50 transaction cost variables which we combine into the sets of three to seek a true model of patenting activity. This implies that a total of 270,825 regressions is to be estimated per variable including the constant term which gives a total of 13,541,250 replicated regressions spanning across 20 years and allows us to check the robustness of the underlying parameter estimates on the acquisition of the valid EPO patent from Table 4 and Table 5in more detail.
In Table 6 , the extreme bounds of transaction costs are reported by focusing on the logistic model. The outcome variable is the approved patent validation for i-th firm in j-th country at time t. The table reports the mean coefficient point-based parameter, the lower and upper bound, standard deviation, the fraction of time the underlying parameter is negative and significant at 5% as well as positive and significant, and the cumulative distribution function for 0   . In Panel A, the extreme bounds of administrative transaction costs ae reported. The evidence suggests higher costs of starting business downsize the probability of acquiring a valid patent in more than 99 percent of all regressions which highlights large and unambiguous effects on firm-level innovation. In addition, higher costs of obtaining electricity connection, greater procedural complexity in starting business, and more stringent paid-in minimum capital requirements appear to be extremely robust in explaining the differential propensities to acquire a valid patent across firms and countries since the underlying CDF is above 0.9 across the entire set of replicated core regressions which is further indicated by the fraction of time the underlying parameters are below zero. The extreme bounds on the duration of obtaining electricity connection and total tax rate indicate a robust negative effect on the propensity to acquire a valid patent. The number of tax payments, duration of dealing with construction permits, and duration of paying taxes tend to exhibit a moderate but discernable effect on the patenting propensity whereas the number of days to start business, number of procedures in dealing with construction permits, and the associated dealing cost are fragile in explaining the cross-firm propensity to acquire a valid patent.
Consider the coefficient bounds on the effects of cross-border transaction costs displayed in Panel B. The evidence outright suggests that some cross-border costs are pivotal in shaping the patenting propensities whereas others are not. In particular, enlarging the number of documents necessary to export and greater duration of export procedures generate a negative effect on the firm-level patenting propensity in more than 95 percent and 93 percent of the replicated regressions, respectively which suggests that time and administrative burden on international trade matter. Higher import and export cost fail to generate an equivalent negative effect which lies on the negative interval of the distribution for less than 20 percent of the time, testifying to its weakness in encouraging firm-level innovation. Similarly weak effects are indicated by the number of days and documents to import. In both respective cases, the CDF indicates an ambiguous effect on innovation at best since the corresponding CDF is below 0.5 in both cases. Notes: the table presents the extreme bounds of the transaction costs in explaining the propensity to acquire a valid EPO patent. The outcome variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a valid patent is acquired in a given year for each country-firm matched pair. The table reports the mean point coefficient estimate, the standard error, its upper and lower bound with the corresponding standard errors, the percentage of replications yielding either positive or negative coefficient estimate at 5% significance level, the cumulative distribution function for β<0, and the verdict on the established effect.
In Panel C, the effects of property rights-related and contractual transaction costs are presented based on the full set of extreme bounds specifications. The most powerful effect on the approval of patent validation is indicated by the change in the cost of property registration, depth of credit information index, and by the duration of contract enforcement. For each of these covariates, the established mean effect is negative and statistically significant at 5% in more than 90 percent of the re-estimated model specifications. The evidence clearly advocates the detrimental effect of higher costs of property registration on the firm-level patent validation whereas requiring firms to reveal an excessive amount of information to the lenders and greater duration of contract enforcement procedures through a lawsuit tends to counterbalance the beneficial effects of low-cost property registration. Despite seemingly weak effects found in Table 4 , adding greater number of property registration procedures yields a slight but persistent negative effect on the propensity to patent since the established effect based on extreme bounds is negative in more than 89 percent of replications. In addition, greater duration of property registration procedures does not seem to produce a large-scale negative effect on patenting activity since the underlying CDF(0) is below zero threshold in only about 44 percent of replications. Higher rate of recovery creditors recuperate on debtors' proceedings and better management of debtors' assets offset a robust increase in the patenting propensity in more than 75 percent and 72 percent of replications, respectively. The relative importance of the effects of costs of resolving insolvent firms on patenting activity is further reinforced by the CDF(0) on the costs of resolving insolvency suggesting higher costs significantly cut the odds of the approved validation in 69 percent of core model replications. The effect of greater credit participation on validation outcome is ambiguous at best since it lies within both intervals in an equivalent share of replications in a similar fashion to the effect of insolvency proceedings reorganization plan. Higher cost of contract enforcement and longer duration of insolvency proceedings are primarily not associated with a discernable, robust and stable effect on the patenting activity compared to the other types of propertyand contracts-related transaction costs. Contrary to the weak effects in Table 4 , the effect of stronger legal rights for lenders and borrowers on the firm-level propensity to patent is stable, robust and highly significant suggesting strengthening such rights is an important mechanism behind greater innovation capacity since the CDF(0) is above zero and significant at 5% in more than 95 percent of replications testifying to its robustness.
In Panel D, the effects of transaction costs inside the firm related to corporate governance are evaluated at extreme bounds. The evidence strongly suggests intra-firm transaction costs and corporate governance are extremely robust determinants on patenting activity across firms and countries. The evidence confirms prior established effects from Table 5 . Firm-level propensity to patent correlates strongly with the extent of shareholder rights and role in major corporate decisions. In a striking contrast to column (2) in Table 5 , extending shareholders rights in the major corporate decisions yields a negative effect on the odds of the approved patent validation where the corresponding CDF(0) is below zero in more than 95 percent of replications. Without the CDF(0), the probability that a randomly chosen set of coefficients from the entire point estimate distribution is below zero is estimated at 78 percent whereas the probability of the establishing the effect above zero is estimated at less than 2 percent. An excessive extension of shareholder governance might not always stimulate firm-level innovation since the estimated CDF(0) is in the negative range for more than 90 percent of the time although the effect is quantitatively small but yet statistically significant at 5%. As a corollary, greater protection of minority investors is associated with a marked increase in the odds of patent validation since the estimated β is greater than zero in more than 94 percent of replications while the CDF(0) essentially rules out the possibility of the systematic negative or ambiguous effect on the patent validation outcome. The beneficial effect of protecting minority investors inside the firm is further indicated by the robust effects of conflict of interest regulation. Enhancing the de jure and de facto conflict of interest regulation yields a robust and discernable positive effect on the firm-level patenting activity in more than 96 percent of the replications which advocates its robustness to various specification bias when the true model is potentially unmatched by the existing set of covariates. In a similar vein, enhancing the ability of shareholders to sue the board of directors and hold it liable for pre-judicial inter-party transactions as well as greater corporate transparency tend to produce a strong and positive effect on the patenting activity which holds across more than 90 percent of the model replications and specification checks. Likewise, mandatory information disclosure requirements predict a similar increase in the odds of approved patent validation with the probability greater than 95 percent. Greater ease of shareholder suits such as access to internal corporate documents, obtainable evidence during trial and through a systematized allocation of legal expenses likewise tends to generate a marked increase in the patenting propensity. The potentially negative effect of shareholder suits is easily ruled out since our CDF(0) clearly indicates the fraction of time the estimated effect is below zero is less than 1 percent.
Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit the variation in cross-country and cross-firm transaction costs to explain the propensity of firms to innovate. Drawing on a large dataset from European Patent Office (EPO) covering over 15,000 firms from 100 countries over the period 1991-2015, we compute the conditional probabilities of individual firms to acquire a valid patent and construct firm-level propensities to innovate, and examine whether lower transaction costs encourage firm-level innovation. Our empirical strategy specifically controls for firm-level idiosyncrasies, country-level unobserved effects and common technology shocks that potentially invoke omitted variable bias in the conditional effects of transaction costs on the propensity to patent. Using a large and detailed dataset on the distribution and level of transaction costs across countries, this paper sets to examine the marginal effects of higher transaction costs on the firm-level propensity to patent. Our work contributes to this law and economics literature by considering the interrelationships between propensity to patent, innovative activity and transaction costs generated by different legal systems.
Using factor analysis, we establish four latent indices of transaction costs with high internal consistency that exhibit the maximum common variation across firms and countries. First, administrative transaction costs capture the ease of starting economic activity and the difficulty of dealing with licenses and permits in the contact with government officials. Second, procedural transaction costs capture the strength of contract enforcement and security of property rights. Third, cross-border transaction costs capture the difficulty of international trade. And fourth, information disclosure-related transaction costs capture the extent of information disclosure to the shareholders, quality and transparency of corporate governance, and minority shareholder protection against the corporate boards.
